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Abstract 
	
The	purpose	of	this	research	is	to	investigate	the	possibility	of	using	aspects	of	model	selection	
theory	to	overcome	both	a	logical	problem	and	an	epistemic	problem	that	prevents	progress	
towards	the	truth	being	measured	while	maintaining	a	realist	approach	to	science.	Karl	Popper	
began	such	an	investigation	into	the	problem	of	progress	in	1963	with	the	idea	of	
verisimilitude,	but	his	attempts	failed	to	meet	his	own	criteria,	the	logical	and	epistemic	
problems,	for	a	metric	of	progress.	Although	philosophers	have	attempted	to	fix	Popper’s	
verisimilitude,	none	have	seemed	to	overcome	both	criteria	yet.	My	research	analyzes	the	
similarities	between	Predictive	Accuracy	(PA)	and	Akaike’s	Information	Criterion	(AIC),	both	
parts	of	model	selection	theory,	and	Popper’s	criteria	for	progress.	I	find	that,	in	ideal	data	
situations,	it	seems	that	PA	and	AIC	satisfy	both	criteria;	however,	in	non-ideal	data	situations,	
there	are	issues	that	appear.	These	issues	present	an	interesting	dilemma	for	scientific	progress	
if	it	turns	out	that	our	theories	are	in	non-ideal	data	situations,	yet	PA	and	AIC	seem	to	be	
better	overall	indicators	of	scientific	progress	towards	the	truth	than	other	attempts	at	
overcoming	the	problems	of	Popper’s	verisimilitude.		
	
	
Predicting the Truth: Overcoming Problems with Popper’s 
Verisimilitude Through Model Selection Criteria 
 
 
One	problem	when	discussing	scientific	progress	is	whether	or	not	our	current	theories	
have	made	any	progress	towards	the	truth,	or	have	just	become	better	predictive	tools.	There	
is	an	intuitive	notion	that	newer	theories	are	truer	than	older	theories	because	they	appear	to	
identify	more	true	causes	of	a	target	system.	However,	it	turns	out	that	it	is	notoriously	difficult	
to	provide	an	analysis	of	what	it	means	for	one	theory	to	be	closer	to	the	truth	than	another	
theory.	The	issue	is	even	more	pronounced	when	considering	the	pessimistic	meta-induction:	
since	all	of	our	past	theories	have	been	false,	it	is	likely	that	all	of	our	current	theories	will	also	
be	false	and	our	future	theories	as	well.	This	poses	a	problem	for	scientific	realism	which	holds	
that	identifying	the	true	causes	of	a	target	system	is	an	important	aim	of	science.		
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While	the	discovery	of	new	causes	that	affect	target	systems	does	seem	to	be	an	
important	part	of	scientific	progress,	it	is	not	clear	that	increasing	the	ability	to	predict	the	
behavior	of	target	systems	will	always	correspond	to	knowing	more	causes	of	that	system	
(Forster	and	Sober	1994).	In	fact	there	is	some	evidence	that	our	best	predictive	models	and	
theories	might	not	always	be	our	best	explanatory	models	and	theories	(Goldsby	2013).	
However,	if	we	want	to	define	progress	in	realist	terms,	there	needs	to	be	some	account	of	
what	proximity	to	the	truth	is	and	how	newer	theories	get	us	closer	to	the	truth.	I	will	refer	to	
these	two	concerns	as	the	logical	problem	and	the	epistemic	problem	respectively.	
An	early	attempt	to	overcome	the	logical	and	epistemic	problems	was	introduced	by	
Karl	Popper	in	his	work	Conjectures	and	Refutations.	Popper	(1963)	called	his	attempt	to	
overcome	the	two	problems	verisimilitude.	The	concept	behind	verisimilitude	is	intuitive	in	
nature	–	a	theory	is	closer	to	the	truth	if	it	makes	more	true	claims	and	fewer	false	claims	–	but	
his	later	commentators	would	point	out	critical	flaws	such	that	verisimilitude	was	found	to	be	
inadequate	for	solving	either	the	logical	or	the	epistemic	problem.	A	number	of	attempts	have	
been	made	to	revise	or	fix	Popper’s	language	to	make	verisimilitude	work,	but	none	have	
overcome	both	the	logical	and	epistemic	problems.	However,	if	progress	can	be	defined	as	
overcoming	the	logical	and	epistemic	problems,	then	it	is	possible	there	may	exist	a	framework	
elsewhere	that	satisfies	that	criteria.	
One	possible	framework,	predictive	accuracy	(PA),	is	a	measure	of	the	ability	of	a	model	
to	predict	new	data	given	old	data.	One	plausible	assumption	is	that	the	true	model	will	be	
maximally	predictively	accurate,	so	increasing	predictive	accuracy	will	get	one	closer	to	the	
truth.	According	to	Forster	and	Sober	(1994),	PA	may	be	estimated	using	Akaike’s	Information	
Criterion	(AIC).	If	PA	can	be	a	measure	of	closeness	to	the	truth,	then	using	a	model	selection	
framework	like	AIC	can	select	models	closer	to	the	truth.	If,	in	turn,	AIC	can	select	a	model	that	
is	closer	to	the	truth	because	it	is	more	predictively	accurate	than	competing	models,	AIC	can	
be	useful	for	estimating	progress.	In	this	way,	PA	overcomes	the	logical	problem	by	being	a	
measure	of	how	one	model	can	be	closer	to	the	truth	than	another,	and	AIC	overcomes	the	
epistemic	problem	by	showing	that,	when	a	new	model	is	selected,	it	is	because	of	both	its	
increased	proximity	to	the	truth	as	well	as	its	ability	to	predict	new	data.	
The	main	concern	for	this	paper	is	to	investigate	whether	PA	and	AIC	actually	can	
overcome	the	logical	and	epistemic	problems.	I	will	begin	by	explaining	why	a	notion	of	
verisimilitude	is	important	for	the	progress	of	science.	I	will	then	provide	some	background	to	
Popper’s	account	of	verisimilitude,	and	I	will	introduce	model	selection	theory	and	explain	how	
PA	and	AIC	appear	to	satisfy	the	criteria	demanded	by	verisimilitude.	I	will	argue	that	PA	and	
AIC	can	overcome	both	problems	while	in	an	ideal	data	situation	and	discuss	what	may	occur	
while	in	non-idea	data	situations.	Finally,	I	will	address	the	problems	of	PA	and	AIC	as	a	form	of	
verisimilitude	and	discuss	what	sort	of	progress	we	may	actually	have	made.	
	
Why	is	Progress	Towards	the	Truth	Important?	
There	are	two	basic	accounts	of	the	goals	of	scientific	inquiry:	realism	and	
instrumentalism.	Scientific	realism	maintains	a	concern	for	understanding	the	truth	behind	
phenomena	including	things	that	can’t	be	directly	observed.	Even	if	the	pessimistic	induction	is	
right,	realism	holds	that	newer	theories	can	be	closer	to	the	truth	than	older	theories.	For	
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example,	it	seems	correct	to	say	that	even	though	Copernicus’s	heliocentric	model	of	the	solar	
system	is	false,	it	is	still	closer	to	the	truth	than	Ptolemy’s	geocentric	model.		
Unlike	realists,	instrumentalists	view	scientific	theories	as	tools	that	help	capture	or	
predict	observable	phenomena	regardless	of	the	truth-value	of	the	theories	themselves	
(Chakravartty	2014).	In	this	way,	an	instrumentalist	values	theories	that	can	predict	or	account	
for	observable	phenomena	even	if	we	can’t	know	the	truth	about	the	unobservable	
commitments	of	that	theory	(Van	Fraassen	1980).	Instrumentalists	believe	that	the	truth	of	
unobservables	is	inaccessible	and	science	should	be	aimed	at	predicting	observable	phenomena	
rather	than	identifying	all	and	only	true	causes.		
	 Although	Popper	was	a	realist,	his	critics	would	point	out	that	his	hypothetico-deductive	
approach38	to	science	by	falsifying	theories	only	winnows	away	at	an	infinite	set	of	false	
theories	and	this	does	not	constitute	actual	progress.	Popper’s	(1963)	verisimilitude	was	his	
attempt	to	show	that	false	theories	could	have	degrees	of	closeness	to	the	truth,	and	that	
removing	false	theories	does	constitute	progress	towards	the	truth.	Popper	hoped	that	
verisimilitude	would	allow	him	to	be	a	realist	while	still	holding	to	his	hypothetico-deductive	
approach	to	scientific	inquiry.	If	progress	towards	the	truth	is	the	goal	of	science	as	Popper	
claims,	then	discarding	an	instrumentalist	approach	is	an	important	step.		
	
Popper’s	Verisimilitude	
Popper	correctly	identified	the	logical	and	epistemic	problems	that	must	be	overcome	
for	verisimilitude	to	provide	a	measure	of	progress.	The	aims	of	verisimilitude	can	be	easily	
formulated	as	the	following	questions:		 	
	
(A)	Can	we	explain	how	one	theory	can	be	closer	to	the	truth,	or	has	greater	
verisimilitude	than	another?		
(B)	Can	we	show	that	scientific	practice	has	sometimes	led	to	theories	which	are	closer	
to	the	truth	than	their	predecessors?	(Forster;	ms)	39	
	
The	first	question	addresses	the	logical	problem:	we	must	have	an	account	of	how	one	theory	is	
closer	to	the	truth	than	another.	The	second	question	addresses	the	epistemic	problem.	Given	
our	epistemic	limitations,	we	must	be	able	to	determine	that	the	selection	of	one	theory	over	
another	is	actually	progress	towards	the	truth.		
	 Of	course,	Popper	had	to	clarify	how	the	degrees	of	truth	would	be	measured.	Popper's	
(1963)	intuitive	definition	of	verisimilitude,	Vs,	of	theory	A	is	based	upon	a	measure	of	the	true	
and	false	contents	of	A.	The	Ct(A)	is	made	of	all	of	the	logical	consequences	of	A	and	can	be	
divided	into	truth	content,	CtT(A),	and	false	content,	CtF(A).	Truth	content	of	A	is	the	set	of	all	
claims	that	are	true	in	Ct(A),	and	false	content	is	the	set	of	all	claims	that	are	false	in	Ct(A).	
CtF(A),	subtracted	from	CtT(A)	provides	a	measure	of	verisimilitude:																																																										
38	Popper’s	(1959)	hypothetico-deductive	approach	was	presented	in	his	Logic	of	Scientific	Discovery.	According	to	
Popper’s	method,	a	hypothesis	should	be	formed	in	a	way	that	can	be	deductively	falsified	rather	than	supported	
by	evidence.	
39	Forster	credits	an	unpublished	manuscript	by	Alan	Musgrave	for	this	formulation	of	the	logical	and	epistemic	
problems. 
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Vs(A)=	CtT(A)-CtF(A)	(Popper	1963,	234)	
	
This	intuitive	definition	provides	the	basic	notion	behind	verisimilitude	within	a	single	theory	by	
determining	the	number	of	true	and	false	logical	consequences	of	theory	A.	The	intuitive	notion	
behind	this	measure	is	simple;	it	provides	a	measure	Vs(A)	based	upon	CtT(A)	and	CtF(A).	By	
quantifying	the	true	and	false	content	of	theories,	this	definition	would	allow	two	theories,	A	
and	B,	to	be	compared	as	follows:	
	
	 𝑉𝑠 𝐴 > 𝑉𝑠 𝐵 ↔ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 − 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 > [𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 − 𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 ] 	
	
The	intuitive	definition	is	a	good	first	pass	at	the	logical	problem,	but	real	theories	are	more	
complicated.	For	example,	assume	there	are	two	theories,	A	and	B,	and	that	theory	A	and	
theory	B	are	both	false.	To	explain	this	concept,	Popper	(1963)	offers	the	following	example	for	
any	given	theory:	assume	that	today	is	Monday	and	theory	A	states	that	today	is	Tuesday;	
although	theory	A	is	false,	it	still	entails	true	logical	content	such	as	today	is	not	Wednesday	
and	today	is	either	Monday	or	Tuesday	(Popper	1963).	Because	there	are	an	infinite	number	of	
consequences,	the	Popper’s	first	pass	can’t	actually	serve	as	a	measure	of	verisimilitude.		
Popper	improved	upon	his	first	pass	by	using	set-theoretic	terms	to	create	a	contrastive	
definition	of	verisimilitude.	Popper’s	(1963)	contrastive	verisimilitude	(PCV)	can	be	stated	as	
follows:	
	
(PCV)					𝑉𝑠 𝐴 < 𝑉𝑠 𝐵 ↔ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 ⊂ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 ∧ [𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 ⊆ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 ]	
	
That	is	to	say	that	for	B	to	have	greater	verisimilitude,	B	must	make	every	true	claim	made	by	A	
and	at	least	one	additional	true	claim	not	made	by	A,	and	every	false	claim	made	by	B	must	also	
be	made	by	A	without	any	additional	false	claims.		
As	an	example,	consider	Ptolemaic	astronomy	and	Copernican	astronomy.	For	the	sake	
of	simplicity,	suppose	that	the	only	difference	in	content	between	Ptolemaic	astronomy	and	
Copernican	astronomy	is	the	location	of	the	sun	and	the	Earth.	Copernican	astronomy	makes	
one	true	claim	not	made	by	Ptolemaic	astronomy,	the	Earth	revolves	around	the	sun.	Ptolemaic	
astronomy	makes	one	false	claim	not	made	by	Copernican	astronomy,	the	sun	revolves	around	
the	Earth.	If	PCV	holds,	Copernican	astronomy	has	greater	verisimilitude	because	it	makes	all	
the	true	claims	that	Ptolemaic	astronomy	makes	plus	an	additional	true	claim,	all	the	false	
claims	made	by	Ptolemaic	astronomy	are	also	made	by	Copernican	astronomy,	and	Copernican	
astronomy	makes	one	fewer	false	claim.	Popper	had	examples	like	this	in	mind	when	he	
developed	PCV	to	satisfy	the	criteria	for	verisimilitude.	
	
The	Problem	with	Popper’s	Verisimilitude	
	 	PCV,	however,	is	also	problematic	in	a	similar	manner	to	Popper’s	intuitive	definition.	
Working	independently,	Pavel	Tichý	(1974)	and	David	Miller	(1974)	both	discovered	a	critical	
logical	flaw	to	PCV.	Tichý	and	Miller	both	pointed	out	that	two	competing	false	theories	will	
never	meet	the	subset	relations	PCV	lays	out	because	whenever	a	new	true	consequence	is	
added,	a	new	false	consequence	is	added	as	well.	Consider	the	following	claims:	
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P1:	The	sun	revolves	around	the	earth	
P2:	The	planets	move	in	perfect	circles	
C3:	The	Earth	revolves	around	the	sun	
	
Of	course,	we	now	know	that	P1	and	P2	are	false	and	C3	is	true.	The	Ptolemaic	model	says	P1	
and	P2	are	true.	The	Copernican	model	says	P2	and	C3	are	true.	Now	consider	the	following	
claim:	
	
	 C4:	P2	and	C3	
	
C4	is	false	because	any	conjunction	that	contains	one	false	conjunct	is	always	false.	It	is	also	a	
false	claim	that	is	not	contained	within	the	Ptolemaic	theory.	This	can	be	called	the	conjunction	
problem.	A	true	claim	made	by	theory	B	but	not	made	by	theory	A	can	be	conjoined	with	a	false	
claim	made	by	theory	B	to	create	a	new	false	claim	not	made	by	theory	A.	Thus,	PCV	will	fail.	
The	incomparability	of	false	theories	is	one	of	the	consequences	that	developed	from	
analysis	of	Popper's	theory	of	verisimilitude.	Tichý’s	and	Miller’s	treatments	of	Popper's	work	
show	that	it	is	impossible	to	add	true	consequences	to	a	theory	without	also	adding	false	ones,	
and	equally	impossible	to	subtract	false	consequences	without	also	subtracting	true	ones.	Two	
theories	cannot	be	compared	in	terms	of	scientific	progress	towards	the	truth	as	Popper	has	
defined	it	either	as	an	intuitive	notion	or	through	PCV.		
	
Applying	Model	Selection	as	Verisimilitude	
	 If	the	concern	of	verisimilitude	is	to	produce	results	that	show	theory	progression	is	
moving	towards	the	truth	by	overcoming	the	logical	and	epistemic	problems,	it	may	be	possible	
to	look	to	forms	of	model	selection	that	could	serve	the	same	purpose.	A	model	is	simply	a	set	
of	equations	that	contain	a	number	of	adjustable	parameters	that	is	used	to	explain	or	predict	a	
phenomenon	(Forster	2000).	A	model	can	be	broken	down	into	the	following	parts:	
parameters,	variables,	and	error	terms.	Consider	the	following	toy	models:	
	
											 𝑀1       𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑒	
											 𝑀2       𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! + 𝑒	           𝐹𝐼𝑇       𝑦 = 7𝑥! + 0	
	
In	the	above	models,	y	is	the	dependent	variable,	x1	and	x2	are	independent	variables,	a,	and	b	
are	adjustable	parameters,	and	e	is	an	error	term	to	correct	for	observational	errors.	FIT	is	a	
fitted	model	where	all	the	parameters	are	fixed.	M1	and	M2	represent	families	of	curves	or	
fitted	models.	For	example,	M1	represents	all	the	curves	that	could	occur	when	values	are	
applied	to	the	parameters.	Note	that	FIT	is	a	member	of	the	family	of	fitted	models	of	M1	(and	
M2).40	The	dependent	variable	is	the	measurable	quantity	of	interest,	and	the	independent	
variables	are	the	causes	that	influence	that	quantity.	
Model	selection	is	concerned	with	fitting	models	to	data,	a	process	called	curve	fitting.	
Consider	a	graph	of	collected	data.	From	a	realist	perspective,	it	is	assumed	that	there	is	a	true																																																									
40	All	of	the	fitted	models	of	M1	are	within	the	family	of	M2	where	b	equals	0.		
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curve	that	generates	the	data	(give	or	take	observational	error).	The	goal	of	model	selection	is	
to	find	a	model	that	is	as	close	to	the	true	curve	as	possible	given	the	available	data.	Practicing	
scientists	know	that	when	the	data	set	is	small,	simpler	models	tend	to	be	better	predictors	
than	more	complex	models.	In	fact,	it	is	well	known	that	curves	that	perfectly	go	through	every	
data	point	tend	to	be	poor	predictors	because	they	overfit	the	data.	The	problem	with	
overfitting	is	that	it	mistakes	observational	error	for	a	true	cause	of	the	target	system.	If	the	
goal	of	scientific	realism	is	to	discover	true	causes,	and	model	selection	can	be	used	to	identify	
true	causes	of	a	target	system	by	avoiding	overfitting	and	increasing	PA,	it	may	be	possible	to	
use	model	selection	criteria	to	overcome	the	problems	of	verisimilitude.	
	
Predictive	Accuracy	and	AIC	
Predictive	accuracy,	as	defined	by	Forster	and	Sober	(1994),	is	the	ability	for	a	selected	
model	to	predict	new	data	given	existing	data.	In	situations	where	there	is	little	data	available,	
a	simple	model	may	be	more	predictively	accurate	than	a	more	complex	one,	but	as	more	data	
becomes	available,	the	choice	of	models	may	be	revised	because	the	simpler	model	fails	to	be	
as	predictively	accurate.	For	example,	in	data	poor	situations,	a	simple	model	like	M1	may	be	
more	predictively	accurate,	but,	as	the	amount	of	data	increases,	a	more	complex	model	like	
M2	may	be	selected	because	of	its	greater	ability	to	predict	new	data.		
Although	there	are	many	types	of	model	selection	theories,	this	paper	is	concerned	with	
AIC	due	to	its	relation	to	verisimilitude.	Forster	(2000)	explains	that	an	important	part	of	AIC	is	
that	“the	conclusions	of	AIC	are	.	.	.	about	its	closeness	to	the	truth”	(213).	If	the	true	curve	is	
maximally	predictively	accurate,	and	if	AIC	chooses	the	maximally	predictively	accurate	curve	
given	the	data	available,	increasing	PA	can	overcome	the	logical	problem	and	AIC	should	
overcome	the	epistemic	problem.		
The	purpose	of	AIC	is	to	minimize	the	Kullbach-Leibler	distance41	(K-L)	between	
potential	fitted	curves	within	a	family	and	the	true	curve	represented	by	the	data	(Forster	
2000).	K-L	distance,	as	defined	by	Burnham	and	Anderson	(2002),	indicates	the	distance	
between	a	candidate	model	and	the	true	curve.	However,	since	K-L	distance	cannot	be	
computed	without	a	prior	knowledge	of	the	true	curve,	a	selection	criterion	like	AIC	must	be	
used	(Burnam	and	Anderson	2002).	AIC,	then,	is	supposed	to	provide	an	estimation	of	the	
closeness	to	the	truth	of	a	model.	Sober	(2008)	provides	the	following	formulation	of	AIC:		
	
	𝐴𝐼𝐶(𝑀) =!" 𝐿𝑜𝑔 Pr 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝐿 𝑀 − 𝑘	
	
In	this	formulation,	L(M)	represents	the	likeliest	fitted	model	of	M	given	the	data	available.	
AIC(M)	is	found	by	taking	the	log	likelihood	of	L(M)	and	subtracting	a	penalty	for	complexity,	k.	
The	term	k	represents	the	number	of	parameters	in	the	model	and	is	used	to	prevent	AIC	from	
overfitting	a	model	given	the	data	when	models	are	being	compared.	Complex	models	always	
fit	the	data	better	than	simpler	models,	but	as	noted	earlier,	complex	models	are	not	always	
better	predictors	due	to	problems	of	overfitting.	By	having	the	correction	for	complexity,	AIC	is																																																									
41	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	K-L	distance	is	not	a	true	distance	because	it	does	not	satisfy	the	triangle	inequality.	
However,	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper	the	term	“distance”	works	to	clearly	relate	the	concept	of	closeness	or	
proximity	between	curves.	
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able	to	provide	a	reliable	estimate	of	the	model’s	PA.	Thus,	AIC	only	selects	a	model	with	a	
greater	number	of	parameters	when	the	log	likelihood	overcomes	the	k	penalty.	
	 Because	AIC	scores	are	dependent	on	the	size	of	the	data	set,	as	the	amount	of	data	
increases,	AIC	could	select	more	complex	models.	For	example,	assume	that	there	are	three	
candidate	models:	
	
											 𝑀1       𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑒	
											 𝑀2       𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! + 𝑒	
											 𝑀3       𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! + 𝑐𝑥! + 𝑒	
	
In	a	data	poor	situation,	AIC	might	favor	the	simpler	model	such	that	the	following	inequality	
holds:	AIC(M1)>AIC(M2)>AIC(M3).	As	we	gather	more	evidence	and	the	size	of	the	data	set	
increases,	the	AIC	might	recommend	M2	over	M1	if	the	AIC	score	of	M2	is	greater	than	M1.	If	it	
is	true	that	x2	is	a	new	cause	affecting	the	system,	then	it	may	seem	that	increasing	PA	will	
likewise	increase	closeness	to	the	truth.	In	this	way,	the	use	of	PA	and	AIC	makes	great	progress	
dealing	with	both	the	logical	and	epistemic	problems.	Forster	and	Sober	(1994)	indicate	that	
minimizing	K-L	distance	to	the	true	curve	is	the	same	as	maximizing	predictive	accuracy.	When	
selecting	a	model	with	the	best	AIC	score,	the	model	being	selected	is	the	closest	model	to	the	
true	curve	given	the	available	data.		
	 The	contrastive	nature	of	PA	and	AIC	also	seem	to	overcome	the	epistemic	problem	that	
PCV	failed	to	do.	As	new	data	is	gathered,	AIC	may	select	a	different	family	of	curves	with	
greater	predictive	accuracy	than	the	current	model.	Because	there	is	an	existing	metric	of	truth	
with	the	AIC	score,	obtaining	a	better	score	and	increasing	PA	provides	a	contrastive	view	of	
progress	similar	to	what	Popper	had	attempted	to	do	with	PCV.	In	the	examples	of	M1,	M2,	and	
M3	above,	when	AIC	selects	M2	over	M1,	an	increase	in	closeness	to	the	truth	is	being	made	
along	with	an	increase	in	predictive	accuracy.	That	is,	the	new	model	is	capturing	more	true	
causes	of	the	target	system	while	increasing	the	ability	to	accurately	predict	new	data.		
	
When	AIC	Fails	
	 However,	the	ability	for	PA	and	AIC	to	overcome	the	logical	and	epistemic	problems	is	
based	on	ideal	data	situation.	In	data	poor	or	data	rich	situations,	there	are	complications	that	
arise	and	create	interesting	dilemmas.	Assume,	for	example,	there	is	a	target	system	that	has	
three	causes	previously	identified;	however,	the	size	of	the	data	set	is	small.	Even	though	we	
may	know	there	are	three	causes	of	the	target	system,	AIC	may	select	a	simpler	model	with	
only	one	cause	because	it	will	have	greater	predictive	accuracy	instead	of	a	model	that	includes	
all	three	causes	and	is	closer	to	the	truth.	This	wrinkle	may	seem	minor,	but	it	shows	that	AIC	
may	be	tracking	our	ability	to	predict	new	data	rather	than	tracking	a	theory’s	closeness	to	the	
truth	in	such	a	way	that,	while	it	can	overcome	the	logical	problem,	it	only	does	so	in	ideal	data	
situations.	However,	the	epistemic	problem	is	still	answered	since,	as	data	increases,	AIC	selects	
models	that	do	identify	more	true	causes	of	the	target	system	as	the	predictive	accuracy	
increases	for	those	models.	
	 Before	turning	to	the	next	dilemma,	the	e	term	for	observational	error	must	be	
discussed.	All	of	our	scientific	inquiry	is	subject	to	observational	error	or	noise	that	is	included	
in	a	data	set.	AIC	assumes	that	observational	error	is	present	and	accounts	for	it,	but	the	very	
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presence	of	observational	error	is	what	leads	to	a	greater	problem	behind	AIC.	There	is	a	
possibility	that	AIC	will	fail	in	data	rich	situations	by	selecting	models	that	are	further	from	the	
truth.	While	the	error	term	included	in	models	is	supposed	to	deal	with	observational	errors,	as	
data	sets	get	larger,	there	is	a	chance	that	AIC	will	recommend	an	additional	parameter	that	is	
not	a	cause	of	the	system	being	investigated.	In	other	words,	our	model	selection	framework	
might	be	tracking	the	cause	of	observational	error	and	mistakenly	attributing	it	as	a	cause	of	
the	system	under	investigation.	Forster	and	Sober	(1994)	explain	that	AIC	was	designed	to	
estimate	the	size	of	the	overfitting	factor,	but	they	also	mention	that	the	process	is	fallible.	
Given	the	possibility	for	AIC	to	recommend	an	error	term	as	a	new	cause,	we	are	now	left	with	
an	interesting	dilemma	wherein	either	the	logical	problem	or	the	epistemic	problem	will	
reassert	itself.	I	will	consider	each	horn	of	the	dilemma	separately.		
	 I	will	begin	by	addressing	the	first	horn.	If	our	goal	is	to	discover	all	the	true	causes	
affecting	the	target	system,	then	in	data	rich	situations	we	cannot	be	sure	that	a	newly	
discovered	variable	is	representing	a	cause	of	the	target	system	or	a	cause	of	our	observational	
error.	If	AIC	is	identifying	causes	of	something	outside	of	the	target	system,	then	there	are	
some	cases	where	we	cannot	tell	whether	progress	is	being	made	even	if	we	are	increasing	
predictive	accuracy.	
	 To	illustrate	the	second	horn	of	the	dilemma,	we	can	consider	how	a	defender	of	the	
model	selection	framework	might	reply	to	the	first	horn.	One	might	maintain	that	increasing	PA	
always	gets	us	closer	to	some	truth.	However,	the	truth	being	identified	by	increasing	PA	ceases	
to	be	about	the	target	system,	but	begins	to	track	the	truth	about	the	system	that	generates	
the	data.	This	new	system	would	take	account	of	both	the	target	system	and	the	causes	of	our	
observational	error.	In	such	a	situation,	we	give	up	the	noumena	in	favor	of	the	phenomena	–	
we	exchange	our	realist	notion	of	the	truth	of	a	target	system	for	the	appearance	created	by	
the	data.	It	is	hard	to	see	how	such	a	solution	would	be	palatable	to	scientific	realists.	Since	the	
logical	problem	was	supposed	to	allow	for	scientific	realism,	it	seems	that	such	a	step	gives	up	
on	the	logical	problem	altogether.		
	 These	two	horns	of	AIC	create	a	trade	off	when	dealing	with	the	logical	and	epistemic	
problems.	Either	we	accept	that	our	choice	in	models	can	select	better	theories	but	we	cannot	
always	tell	if	we	are	getting	closer	to	the	truth,	or	we	give	up	on	scientific	realism	in	favor	of	the	
notion	that	models	with	greater	PA	are	closer	to	the	truth	about	the	system	that	gives	rise	to	
the	data	but	not	the	true	target	of	our	inquiry.		
	
Conclusion	
PA	and	AIC	seem	to	be	heading	in	the	right	direction	in	understanding	progress.	
However,	if	providing	answers	to	Popper’s	logical	and	epistemic	questions	are	the	criteria	by	
which	a	true	sense	of	progress	can	be	determined,	PA	and	AIC	seem	to	fall	short	of	the	mark	if	
we	want	to	maintain	a	realist	approach	to	progress	in	all	cases.	The	problem	of	data	poor	
situations	can	be	overcome	by	increasing	the	size	of	the	data	pool,	and	progress	towards	the	
truth	can	still	be	made.	However,	in	data	rich	situations	that	may	not	be	the	case.	Although	AIC	
runs	into	this	problem	at	the	extreme	limit,	and	it’s	likely	that	our	extant	theories	have	yet	to	
run	into	it,	there	is	a	possibility	that	AIC	will	stop	modeling	the	true	causes	of	the	target	system	
at	some	point,	and	increasing	PA	will	no	longer	be	progress	towards	the	truth	of	the	target	
system.	Of	course,	increasing	PA	and	selecting	a	model	with	the	best	AIC,	in	ideal	data	
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situations,	does	seem	to	satisfy	both	the	logical	and	epistemic	problem,	so	it	may	give	progress	
hope.	In	terms	of	theories	that	can	capture	closeness	to	the	truth	and	the	movement	of	
progress,	PA	and	AIC	seem	to	come	closer	than	Popper’s	first	attempt.	Reminiscent	of	Popper’s	
hypothetico-deductive	method,	PA	and	AIC	seem	to	hold	up	to	more	severe	tests	than	Popper’s	
theory	of	verisimilitude	did,	and,	in	some	ways,	that	seems	like	it	is	progress	in	itself.		
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